Gender in Intergenerational Educational Persistence Across Time and Place by Schneebaum, Alyssa et al.
ePubWU Institutional Repository
Alyssa Schneebaum and Bernhard Rumplmaier and Wilfried Altzinger
Gender in Intergenerational Educational Persistence Across Time and Place
Article (Accepted for Publication)
(Refereed)
Original Citation:
Schneebaum, Alyssa and Rumplmaier, Bernhard and Altzinger, Wilfried (2015) Gender in
Intergenerational Educational Persistence Across Time and Place. Empirica, 42 (2). pp. 413-445.
ISSN 1573-6911
This version is available at: http://epub.wu.ac.at/5721/
Available in ePubWU: September 2017
ePubWU, the institutional repository of the WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, is
provided by the University Library and the IT-Services. The aim is to enable open access to the
scholarly output of the WU.
This document is the version accepted for publication and — in case of peer review — incorporates
referee comments. There are differences in punctuation or other grammatical changes which do not
affect the meaning.
http://epub.wu.ac.at/
Gender in Intergenerational Educational
Persistence Across Time and Place
Alyssa Schneebaum, Bernhard Rumplmaier, Wilfried Altzinger∗
Department of Economics
Vienna University of Economics and Business
February 2015
Abstract
Primarily using data from the 2010 European Social Survey, we analyze inter-
generational educational persistence in 20 European countries, studying cross-country
and cross-cluster differences; changes in the degree of intergenerational persistence
over time; and the role of gender in determining educational persistence across gen-
erations. We find that persistence is highest in the Southern and Eastern European
countries, and lowest in the Nordic countries. While persistence in the Nordic and
Southern countries has declined over time, it has remained relatively steady in the
rest of Europe. Our analysis highlights the importance of a detailed gender anal-
ysis in studying intergenerational persistence, finding that mothers’ education is a
stronger determinant of daughters’ (instead of sons’) education and fathers’ education
a stronger determinant of the education of their sons. For most clusters, declines in
intergenerational persistence over time are largely driven by increasing mobility for
younger women.
JEL Classifications: J62, I24, I38, D63
Key Words: Intergenerational Persistence; Educational Attainment; Educational Welfare
States; Europe; Gender
∗Corresponding author: Alyssa Schneebaum, alyssa.schneebaum@wu.ac.at. The research leading
to these results has received funding from the European Commission’s Seventh Framework Programme
FP7/2007-2013 under grant agreement no. 290647.
1 Introduction
Since as far back as the time of Sir Francis Galton (1869; 1889), there has been little
doubt that descendants inherit at least some of their characteristics from their parents.
Today, the questions around intergenerational persistence of social and economic outcomes
are mainly not about its existence; instead, researchers are more interested in measuring
its extent, its causes, and its development over time.1
Economists have traditionally concentrated their studies of intergenerational persis-
tence on the transmission of income and wealth, whereas the intergenerational persistence
of educational attainment has first become a more popular topic only over the last several
decades. These two sets of outcomes – financial and educational – are certainly related,
and the mechanisms which promote or distill their intergenerational persistence may be
similar. Public policies which tax bequests and those which guarantee free and equal ed-
ucation to all, for example, promote social and economic success based on meritocracy as
opposed to inheritance. A completely hands-off political system could be more likely to
result in very high intergenerational persistence in both spheres as parents would pass on
all advantages (and disadvantages) they themselves faced to their children.
This paper studies three dimensions of intergenerational educational persistence, the
third of which being the central contribution of this paper. First, we look at differences in
persistence across 20 European countries. Existing studies have found great variation in
both income and educational persistence around the world (see e.g. Solon, 2002; Hertz et
al., 2007), and we replicate this work for an extended list of European countries with newer
data. Second, we analyze changes in the strength of the persistence over time, asking how
the degree of the persistence has changed for descendants born in 1920 versus 1985, and
the points between. We show these developments over time for clusters of countries and by
gender, which reveals a very interesting story of the drivers of change in persistence over
time.
Third, the main contribution of this work is the introduction of an extensive analysis
of the role of gender in intergenerational educational persistence. We ask how intergen-
erational persistence in education differs when we consider various combinations of the
gender of the parents and descendants (father-son; father-daughter; mother-son; mother-
daughter). This element of the analysis essentially asks whether men’s and women’s edu-
cational outcomes are more closely related to those of their mothers or fathers, which could
provide interesting insight into the process and determinants of educational attainment.
Finally, we provide an integration of the three dimensions of intergenerational mobility:
differences across countries, by gender, and over time. The economic conditions and social
mores which assign particular (and distinctive) roles to men and women have evolved such
that women’s formal education is more valuable and economically worthwhile than ever
1There is, of course, also the question of the optimal level of intergenerational persistence, which this
paper does not address. For an excellent review of the history of thought on intergenerational mobility in
economics, which does deal with this question, see Piketty (2000).
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before, and we see significant differences in persistence and its development over time for
men versus women. We show that prior studies which have ignored or skimmed over gender
have missed much of the detail about the elements of intergenerational persistence that we
provide here. Differences in intergenerational persistence across time and place by gender
jump out of the data. This paper discusses the relevance of these gender-specific findings
for understanding intergenerational educational persistence.
2 Theoretical Background and Literature Review
Children inherit some of their characteristics from their parents; this is true of social
and economic characteristics as well as genetic traits. At least in part because of the social,
economic, and cultural capital transmitted across generations, children of highly educated
parents are more likely to be highly educated themselves compared to children of less edu-
cated parents, and lower-educated parents are more likely to raise a lower-educated child.
The classic application of the human capital model to explaining why this is the case by
Becker and Tomes (1979; 1986) says that descendants’ income is positively correlated with
parental income due in large part to parents’ investments in their descendants’ education.
Solon (2004) makes important extensions to this analytical model to study differences in
intergenerational persistence over time and across countries, finding that intergenerational
persistence is positively related to the “heritability of income-related traits, the efficacy of
human capital investment, and the earnings return to human capital,” and negatively re-
lated to public investments in human capital (p. 38). The current paper can be seen as an
empirical supplement to Solon’s (2004) model: while we do not test the causal relationship
between intergenerational persistence and the socioeconomic and political characteristics
he defines, we present measures of persistence for different countries, country clusters, and
intergenerational gender pairs, which may be related to them. Some of this analysis is
systematic replication of earlier work, but we add what turns out to be a crucial piece of
the story of persistence of educational attainment across generations: the role of parental
and descendant gender.
The models in Becker and Tomes (1979; 1986) and Solon (2004) focus on the role of hu-
man capital in intergenerational persistence, but it is important to note that (dis)advantages
are transmitted across generations not only via investments in human capital. Esping-
Andersen (2005, p. 14) states that it might not be unequal investments in children’s
education alone that drive intergenerational persistence, but instead that “[i]t is in early
childhood that parental transmission is key.” Cultural and social capital2 are transmitted
to children from their earliest days and influence their social, economic, and educational
success throughout their lives. Cultural capital includes style of speech, physical appear-
ance, skills, knowledge, attitudes, and formal educational training. How parents project
themselves in the world and to their children, then, has meaningful consequences on the
2See the development of the theory of social capital in Bourdieu (1986).
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behaviors that children learn for themselves. The various forms of capital interact with
each other; more of one makes the others more easily accessible. Thus parental advan-
tages are passed to children in part through investments in descendants’ human capital
and additionally through the culture of the family and its social networks. Indeed Chetty
et al. (2014a) found that areas of the United States with higher levels of social capital –
as measured by higher voter turnout rates, higher percentages of households who return
their Census form, greater participation in community organizations, more religiosity, and
lower crime rates – have higher degrees of intergenerational income mobility.
Of course it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to measure most factors of an
individual’s cultural or social capital; those measures used in the Chetty et al. (2014a)
study, for example, simply serve as proxies for such kinds of capital. Empirical research
on intergenerational persistence of social and economic outcomes can focus instead on
the relatively reliable and easy-to-measure data on educational attainment. Like every
empirical research study, this approach has its limitations; educational attainment does
not tell the whole story of one’s economic and social success. However, measuring the
intergenerational persistence of educational attainment can provide important information
about the inheritance of cultural, social, and human capital. Aside from education being
an important measure of well-being in its own right, parental education levels can be a
contributor to their permanent income levels, which have a much more positive role than
current income in determining descendant outcomes (see e.g. Carneiro and Heckman, 2005)
This study, as many others in the literature, will look at the association between
parental and descendant education, without seeking a causal relationship to explain how
parents’ outcomes affect those of their descendants. There is a growing literature on the
causal effects of parental circumstances on the success of their descendants, which applies a
variety of methods to find intergenerational relationships. These studies provide important
information about the mechanisms behind intergenerational persistence by teasing out the
effects of “nature” versus “nurture,” asking if it is social or biological factors which are the
source or medium of the transmission. Three main methods to identify causal relation-
ships can be found in the literature. Twin studies examine the effect of the difference in
the education levels of sets of identical twins on their children’s educational attainment,
which is effective because the identical twin parents have the same genetic make-up but
different social (educational) characteristics. Adoptee studies, recognizing that there is
no genetic transmission between adoptees and their adoptive parents, ask if there is a re-
lationship between educational attainment across generations despite this lack of genetic
reproduction. Finally instrumental variable (IV) studies often use an educational reform
as an IV for education, providing a causal interpretation of the parent-child educational
attainment relationship while working around endogeneity issues. An outstanding review
and analysis by Holmlund et al. (2011) shows, however, that measuring “causal” effects
with these three different techniques, even on the same dataset, can lead to drastically dif-
ferent results. They find that measuring causal intergenerational relationships by studying
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sets of twin parents shows positive effects of fathers’ education on descendant outcomes,
but almost no effect from mothers. At the same time, studying adoptees produces very
weak intergenerational relationships, and an educational reform IV estimation shows that
it is the mothers’ education which has the strongest effect on descendant outcomes. It
is thus unclear that “causal” studies are unequivocally preferable in studying intergenera-
tional persistence. Instead, the methods employed should depend on the research question
involved. In this paper, we are looking for simple correlations between parental and de-
scendant education, which are valuable to know in and of themselves – even if there can
be no causal interpretation of our results.
Why study intergenerational educational persistence, instead of looking at the persis-
tence of income across generations? Right now, the literature on the intergenerational
persistence of income is much larger than that on educational attainment (see Blanden
(2013) for a survey of both). However, measuring the intergenerational persistence in edu-
cational attainment rather than in income offers some crucial advantages. For three main
reasons, education is a more reliable outcome to measure than income. First, since income
changes through different life stages, obtaining reliable information about lifetime earnings
is difficult, at best. Instead, education offers a more straightforward measure of economic
and social status that generally remains constant after a certain age (Nguyen et al., 2005),
and education can be a better measure of permanent income than income observed at
one point or even over the course of several years (Carneiro and Heckman, 2005). Second,
reporting income – or any monetary measure – is subject to response bias, in which respon-
dents systematically under- or over-report their income (Bielby et al., 1977). Individuals
may be less inclined to misreport their educational attainment, as it is a less cut and dried
measure of present well-being than income is. Finally, survey respondents, who are gener-
ally the descendants in the intergenerational persistence literature, are much more likely
to know their parents’ level of education than their parents’ income at any point in time,
producing less recall bias (see e.g. Nguyen et al., 2005; Black and Devereux, 2011). Thus
we measure how similar descendants’ educational attainment is to their parents’.3
One goal of this paper is to give a general overview of how public policy may be associ-
ated with intergenerational educational mobility (without looking for a causal relationship).
Speaking more broadly about intergenerational persistence, Becker and Tomes (1986, p.
3) say that “[t]he degree of regression toward or away from the mean in the achievements
of children compared to those of their parents is a measure of the degree of equality of
opportunity in a society.” In other words, societies which have higher intergenerational
persistence in social and economic outcomes such as education provide less equal oppor-
tunity to their members than those with less persistence. While there is some degree of
immobility in educational attainment in all countries around the world (see e.g. Hertz et
3Another option slowly growing in the literature would be to measure the persistence of self-reported
well-being across generations. A recent study shows that results across Europe are similar to the results
we get in this paper, even along the gender dimension (Molina et al., 2011).
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al., 2007), differences in policy structures and institutional arrangements across countries
may be helpful in preventing or supporting intergenerational persistence. Most readers
will be familiar with what has been called the “Great Gatsby Curve” (Corak, 2013), which
shows that countries with higher levels of income inequality are also those with strong
intergenerational persistence. Again this relationship is not causal, but there is an associa-
tion between these characteristics of a society; it suggests that structural and institutional
differences across countries may be related to intergenerational persistence. To the extent
that this is true, we may expect differences in persistence across countries or clusters of
countries with similar policy profiles. Consider, for example, figure 1. Here we have plotted
the intergenerational correlations we calculate below (the method for which is discussed in
detail in section 3) against several different policy measures in the 20 European countries
studied here. The intergenerational correlation is negatively related to public expenditure
per student on primary education, the age at which students take the first exam which
tracks them into different educational career paths, and the share of children enrolled in
pre-school. The latter are based on numbers of pre-school enrollment of children under
the age of 3 years in 2012. Finally the intergenerational correlations are positively related
to the share of students enrolled in private secondary schools. All of these data are from
recent years since consistent data for a time period of 40 years starting from the 1940s are
not available. Consequently this relationship depicted in figure 1 is not causal yet it sug-
gests that some relationship between social policy and intergenerational persistence exists
for the 20 countries studied. Indeed the work of Andrews and Leigh (2009) shows that
more unequal countries of the 1970s were less likely to have experienced social mobility by
the late 1990s. We do not attempt to prove that relationship here, but we often present
our findings in terms of country clusters with similar policy profiles.4
— Figure 1 about here —
If there is a relationship between social policy and intergenerational persistence, we
may expect to see changes in the degree of intergenerational persistence over time as well
as across countries, as relevant social policy evolves. Policies aimed at creating more equal
chances for all members of society and increasing efforts to create welfare systems during the
last century addressed some of the factors that influence social transmission. For example,
the expansion of publicly funded and freely available schooling and school supplies to
Austrian children in the 1970s corresponded with a significant decline in intergenerational
educational persistence after that time (Fessler et al., 2012). To identify these changes
over time, we study persistence in educational attainment for different age groups, thus
4The calculation of the intergenerational correlations employed in these graphs is described in section
3 below; they are the same as those presented in table 2. The data on expenditure per student come
from UNESCO, 2014; on the age of the first tracking exam from the European Commission (2012); on
pre-school enrollment from Eurostat (2012); and on private enrollment from the The World Bank (2014).
These data are based on their values in 2010, since data for these policy issues are not systematically
available for the times in which our respondents were in school.
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allowing us to identify temporal changes. Interestingly, the influential work of Hertz et al.
(2007), which compares educational persistence over time for 42 countries, does not find a
time trend of either rising or falling intergenerational correlation of education on a global
basis. However, Hertz et al. (2007) study just a 50 year time-trend, similar to Chetty et al.
(2014b), who study changes in mobility in the U.S. since the 1970s. In the resuts section
below, we show correlations for descendants born as far back as 1920 to investigate the
development of intergenerational persistence over a longer period of time.
Perhaps the most original aspect of this paper is the analysis of the role of gender
in intergenerational educational persistence. In the existing literature, economists have
largely ignored gender; most studies look only at the educational outcomes of fathers and
their sons. Corak (2013, p. 81) notes that “[i]t is not that studies of mothers, daughters,
and the marriage market do not exist, only that father-son analyses are more common
and permit a broader set of cross-country comparisons.” While analyzing the role of
gender in intergenerational persistence complicates the story, there is enough theoretical
and empirical reason to believe that the degree and source of the persistence differs based
on the gender of the parent and descendant in question and that these differences are an
important element in the overall picture of intergenerational persistence. Further, when
and where differences exist, we may be able to comment on the degree of inequality of
opportunity for women versus men.
Two theoretical frameworks from economics and sociology shed light on why there might
be differences in educational persistence across generations depending on the gender of the
parent and the descendant studied. The first is the household production model which
first appeared in Becker and Tomes (1979; 1986) and was further developed by Chiswick
(1988) and Gang and Zimmermann (2000) to account for the role of mothers’ labor force
participation in the intergenerational transmission of human capital. Here mothers alone
are responsible for the home production of children’s education – a highly stylized aspect of
the model which nevertheless parallels the empirical reality of mothers spending more time
in education with their children than fathers (Leibowitz, 1974; Zick et al., 2001; Sayer et al.,
2004). The model further says that fathers’ education is important to their descendants’
educational attainment only in that the fathers’ higher education increases their earnings
capacity, and some of the higher earnings are used to invest in the descendants’ education.
Mothers’ education affects their children’s educational attainment both through earning
income and through direct household production, which are considered substitutes. As a
mother’s education increases, the opportunity cost of her home production increases, and
she spends less time at home educating her children. Thus the model predicts that father’s
education has a more positive impact than mothers’ on the educational attainment of the
descendants.
A shortcoming of the household production model is that it does not distinguish be-
tween male and female descendants. Thus a second theory of how gender matters in
intergenerational educational persistence, namely a theory of role models and socialization
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within a household, can serve as a useful amendment to the household production model.
Theory on socialization and role models suggest that some social and behavioral charac-
teristics are transmitted from one generation to the next (Haveman and Wolfe, 1995). A
relevant example is gender role attitudes, which are attitudes about how men and women
“ought” to behave. Among other things, these attitudes prescribe norms about the im-
portance and appropriateness of educational attainment for men and women. Gender role
attitudes are passed from one generation to the next (Farre and Vella, 2013). In transmit-
ting their ideas about gender and educational attainment to their children, parents with
traditional educational attainments, i.e. where the father is more highly educated than
the mother, are more likely to encourage their sons to obtain higher education than they
are to encourage their daughters. Similarly, more highly educated mothers are likely to
encourage their daughters to obtain more education. Some preliminary support for this
idea can be found in basic tabulations of the 2010 European Social Survey data we describe
and employ below: when fathers have more education than mothers, daughters average
only 12.9 years of education, while sons average 13.6 years of education. When mothers
are more highly educated than fathers, on the other hand, daughters average 13.4 years
of education, compared to 13.1 for sons. Other findings in the literature for Austria using
Markovian transmission matrices and uni- and multivariate analyses further support this
theory of gender role socialization in intergenerational educational persistence (Fessler and
Schneebaum, 2012).
These two theories of the relevance of gender in intergenerational educational persis-
tence, while partly in competition with each other, both suggest that the persistence in
intergenerational educational attainment will differ by the gender of the parent and the
descendant involved. A crucially important difference in the two models is that the house-
hold production model does not differentiate results based on the gender of the descendant.
While the household production model predicts that fathers are more important for both
sons and daughters, the role-model theory would imply a stronger effect of the same-
gender parent on the descendant. We therefore test the hypothesis that intergenerational
persistence in educational attainment will differ by the gender of the parent and descen-
dant. Further, we integrate the gender, country clusters, and over-time dimensions of the
analysis to see how gender may have mattered differently in different places across time.
This exercise reveals for example not only how intergenerational mobility has changed over
time by gender, but also whether different developments in country clusters originated in
distinctive gender trends.
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3 Data and Methods
3.1 Data
Our data come from the 2010 European Social Survey (ESS) (Norwegian Social Science
Data Services, 2010), which was the fifth and (in terms of parental and descendants’ educa-
tion) most comprehensive wave of the survey.5 The ESS collects data on the International
Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) level of education achieved for each respon-
dent and the respondents’ mothers and fathers. We converted these data on the ISCED
level of education into the number of years of schooling necessary to obtain that level of
education in the respondents’ countries. We did this by matching the ISCED code with
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) data
on school years needed for ISCED level achievement (UNESCO, 2012). Although there
are differences in educational systems and the level of detail collected about educational
attainment across countries in the ESS, converting the ISCED levels into the minimum
number of years needed for a respondent’s education allows us to make the survey as objec-
tive and homogeneous as possible. This conversion creates a more continuous measure of
educational attainment, which further allows us to calculate intergenerational educational
associations and correlations (see section 3.2 below). Blanden (2013, pp. 44-45), following
Dearden et al. (2002), points out that measuring educational achievement with the number
of years in education is not ideal for a study of intergenerational associations/correlations,
because it assumes that the relationship between the educational attainment of the parent
and descendant generation is linear and monotonic. However, Blanden (2013) goes on to
show that a comparison of two international studies, one which used years of education to
obtain intergenerational associations/correlations (Hertz et al., 2007) and the other which
used academic degrees obtained to measure an intergenerational association of education
(Chevalier et al., 2013b), yields fairly highly positively correlated results.
We include only respondents aged 25 or older in our study, to minimize the number
of cases in which the respondents were still studying at the time of the survey. For most
of the analysis, a sample of those aged 25-65 is used, to focus on people still in the labor
market; the exception is the analysis of time trends in intergenerational correlations, where
we study all descendants up to 90 years of age. We use only observations for which we
have information on the educational attainment for both the mother and the father of the
descendant. In total we observe 14,514 (11,291) men and 16,218 (12,424) women between
25-90 (25-65) in 20 different countries. All results are calculated using the design weight
provided in the ESS.
As shown in table 1, both men and women in the descendant population are more
highly educated than those in the parent generation; sons and daughters have, on aver-
age, more than three years more education than their same-gender counterparts in the
5Italy did not participate in the survey after round 2 (2004) and the round 5 data were not available for
Austria at the time of this analysis, so we used data from rounds 2 and 4 for these countries, respectively.
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older generation. Men in both generations completed more years of schooling than women,
yet women are closing the gap and the overall difference between sons and daughters is
only marginal. In most countries, the daughters have completed more years of schooling
than the sons, with the only exceptions being some of the Continental and Southern coun-
tries (Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Switzerland). For the
parental generation, the situation is completely different: the mothers almost always have
fewer years of education than the fathers. Only in Denmark, Ireland, and Sweden, mothers
have on average more years of education than fathers.
— Table 1 about here —
Cross-country differences in mean schooling years are profound. Norway’s men and
women aged 25-65 have an average of 15.05 and 15.08 years of education, respectively, the
highest average in the dataset. On the other hand, men and women in Portugal have only
8.35 and 7.92 years of education, respectively. Portugal is the only country whose average
years of education for the descendants is under ten years, but there are quite a few countries
in which the parents have less than ten years of education. These cross-country differences
are due in part to different education systems and different program lengths, meaning
that an identical ISCED-level in two different countries can be obtained from a different
number of schooling years. Our educational year averages are slightly higher than those
published by United Nations Development Program (2013, p. 144) for all countries, very
likely because our mean education years are limited to people aged 25-65, which excludes
older and thus generally less educated people. Based on this comparison, our schooling
years seem reasonable.
In every country in Europe, the average level of educational attainment from one gen-
eration to the next has increased. At the same time, the distribution of educational attain-
ment has become narrower in the younger generation, meaning that there is less variation
in the years of education obtained by the respondents compared to their parents. This
becomes important in calculating intergenerational persistence, as explained in the next
section.
3.2 Intergenerational Associations and Correlations
We measure the strength of the persistence of educational attainment in one generation
to the next by calculating intergenerational educational associations and correlations. The
model used to estimate an intergenerational educational association βˆ can be written as
Edi = α+ βˆE
p
i + εi ∀ i = 1, 2, . . . , N (1)
where Edi is the educational attainment of descendant i, and E
p
i is the average educational
attainment of both parents (father and mother) of descendant i, and εi is a normally
distributed error term with a mean of zero and a constant variance σ2. The constant α
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provides a level effect, indicating the descendant’s education if the parents had zero years
of schooling. The OLS estimate βˆ is
βˆ = ρdp
σd
σp
(2)
where σd and σp represent the standard deviation in the educational distribution of the
descendant and parent populations, respectively, and ρdp is the correlation coefficient be-
tween the descendant and parent populations. This exposition makes it clear that a change
in βˆ may not necessarily be due to a change in the relationship between the educational
attainment of the two generations: a change in the distribution of the educational at-
tainment of either descendants or parents would also change the association βˆ. Since the
distribution of educational attainment has changed drastically from one generation to the
next in practically every country in our dataset (see table 1), the association would give the
wrong impression about the actual intergenerational educational mobility, overstating it
when the standard deviation of the distribution of the descendant population’s educational
attainment is higher than the parents’, and understating if it is larger for the parents.
Therefore, we estimate intergenerational educational correlations γ and focus our anal-
ysis on these estimates. These correlations normalize the educational attainment of a
population by the standard deviation of their educational distribution (see e.g. Black and
Devereux, 2011; Blanden, 2013), thus eliminating the possibility that the intergenerational
relationship is driven by distributional changes over time:
Edi
σd
= α+ γˆ
Epi
σp
+ εi ∀ i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (3)
By calculating these educational correlations, we are able to compare the strength of the
relationship between parental and descendant educational attainment across countries and
over time, although the distribution of educational attainment in these various subpopu-
lations may be quite different.
Finally, in calculating gender-specific associations and correlations, we model the rela-
tionship between the educational attainment of a descendant and both their mother and
father.6 We use both parents’ educational attainment (separately, while controlling for
the other (see e.g. Gang and Zimmermann, 2000)) in order to be able to tease out the
gender-specific nature of intergenerational persistence. Including the education level of
both parents gives us the effect of an additional year of a parents’ educational attainment
on their child’s education, net of assortative mating effects. Since our research question
deals specifically with the different effects of mothers’ and fathers’ education, it is impor-
6Indeed most studies use only the education level of the father. Many earlier studies which estimated a
joint effect of mothers and fathers dealt with differences in the education level of the two parents by taking
the average of both the father’s and the mother’s education to build the parental education variable (e.g.
Hertz et al., 2007), or by summing the years of education of both parents together (e.g. Oreopouos et al.,
2006). In an Austrian study, Fessler et al. (2012, pp. 77-78) say that due to assortative mating of the
parents, taking the average or taking the maximum of the parents’ education leads to very similar results.
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tant to control for assortative mating effects by including both parents’ education in the
same estimation. One drawback of this approach is that there is likely strong collinearity
between the parents’ schooling. It remains, however, a better option than leaving one
partner out, averaging parental education, or summing parental education, because we are
explicitly interested in the effects of both mothers’ and fathers’ education on descendant
education net of assortative mating effects. Including the educational attainment of both
parents means that the partial effects of both parents will be lower than if we had estimated
results for each parent separately. We thus model
Edi = α+ βˆ1E
f
i + βˆ2E
m
i + βˆ3(E
f
i ∗ δ) + βˆ4(Emi ∗ δ) + βˆ5(δ) + εi ∀ i = 1, 2, . . . , N (4)
for the gender specific intergenerational associations and
Edi
σd
= α+ γˆ1
Efi
σf
+ γˆ2
Emi
σm
+ γˆ3(
Efi
σf
∗ δ) + γˆ4(E
m
i
σm
∗ δ) + γˆ5(δ) + εi ∀ i = 1, 2, . . . , N (5)
for the gender-specific intergenerational correlations, where Ef is the educational attain-
ment of the father and Em is that of the mother, and δ is a dummy variable equal to 0
for sons and 1 for daughters. We interact parental education with the gender dummy vari-
able to capture the differing relationship of parental (mother and father) education with
descendant education for sons and daughters. βˆ1 (γˆ1) will give us the intergenerational
association (correlation) between the educational attainment of fathers and sons; βˆ2 (γˆ2)
for mothers and sons; βˆ1 + βˆ3 (γˆ1 + γˆ3) for fathers and daughters; and βˆ2 + βˆ4 (γˆ2 + γˆ4) for
mothers and daughters. Lastly, βˆ5 (γˆ5) is the coefficient on a control variable for gender,
which is positive (negative) when daughters have higher (lower) education than sons.
3.3 Country Clustering
Some countries are more alike than others in their social welfare state policies regard-
ing education. As discussed above, the strength of the intergenerational persistence of
education may be related to social policy which promotes meritocratic ideals (or not). We
thus analyze intergenerational educational mobility in countries alone and as a part of
so-called “country clusters” which have similar education policy profiles, to get a sense of
any relationship between intergenerational persistence and policy systems.
Our clustering approach links public welfare systems and the educational system fol-
lowing the country-clustering typology of Esping-Andersen (1990). This approach assumes
that a trade-off between educational spending and spending on other welfare policies exists,
in particular that states decide whether to spend money on education policy now to avoid
having to make transfers afterwards (because education should presumably protect people
from needing public support later on) or to focus on social insurance programs instead
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of education. Esping-Andersen (1990) defines three types of welfare states: the liberal
or Anglo-Saxon model, which invests mainly in education; the conservative-corporatist or
Continental model, which tends towards social insurance; and the social-democratic or
Nordic model, which invests in both welfare policies.
Apart from these three “worlds of welfare capitalism,” several scholars have proposed
additions to the typology, with many of them including a Southern or Mediterranean type
of welfare state cluster (Ferrera, 1996; Bonoli, 1997). This Mediterranean group of coun-
tries are characterized by fragmented social security systems and high reliance on family
structures for social and economic welfare (Ferrera, 1996). Finally, the question of whether
the Eastern European countries can be incorporated into the existing clusters or whether
they form a distinctive group of their own has been a matter of discussion. Fenger (2007)
uses hierarchical cluster analysis to classify Central and Eastern European countries, find-
ing overall support for a separate Eastern European cluster despite differences within the
cluster. This cluster can be characterized by strong state investment in education and
social equality due to the collectively communist past, but which has faced relatively low
economic growth (Fenger, 2007, p. 24). Thus despite strong state investment, the com-
paratively poor economic performance of these Eastern or “New Member State” countries
(Crafts and Toniolo, 1996) may be a barrier to distilling intergenerational persistence.
Thus we use a five-type model of welfare states, including an Anglo-Saxon cluster
(Ireland and the UK), a Nordic cluster (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden), a Con-
tinental cluster (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland),
a Southern cluster (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) and an Eastern European cluster
(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland).7 As documented in the existing litera-
ture, the countries within each cluster share a similar welfare system and therefore provide
hints regarding the relationship between different welfare and education policies and inter-
generational educational persistence. Nevertheless, differences in the specific configuration
of social and educational policy across countries within a cluster still exist; these differences
are discussed in further detail below.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Intergenerational Educational Persistence by Country and Cluster
We begin the analysis of our empirical results with an examination of intergenerational
persistence across countries and country clusters. Table 2 presents the intergenerational
educational correlations between parents and their working-age (25-65) descendants in 20
European countries. We focus our description on the correlations presented in table 2
instead of the associations, because, as described in section 3.2, the correlations give a
7When performing analyses by cluster, we take averages of the results for each country in the cluster,
which gives each country an equal “weight” in determining cluster-level effects, regardless of differences in
population sizes across countries in a cluster.
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better measure of persistence across generations, since they eliminate the possibility that
the intergenerational relationship is based in part on structural changes to the educational
distribution across generations.8
— Table 2 about here —
The bottom row of table 2 shows that the intergenerational correlation between all
parents (taken as the average of the two parents’ education) and all descendants (equation
3) is rather high, at 0.486. Thus, after accounting for differences in the distribution of
educational attainment across generations, parents with one year of schooling over their
generation’s mean will raise children with one half year of schooling abive their genera-
tion’s mean. This estimate is consistent with those of Hertz et al. (2007); in the thirteen
countries that their analysis has in common with this one, they get an average correlation
of 0.40. Their estimate is lower than our overall estimate because our analysis includes
seven additional countries, all of which have higher intergenerational correlations.
Table 2 reveals that intergenerational educational persistence is quite different across
our five country clusters. The educational correlation between all parents and all descen-
dants is the lowest in the Nordic cluster, at 0.433, while it is 0.478 for the Continental
and 0.490 for the Anglo-Saxon clusters. The highest correlations are found in the Eastern
and Southern clusters, with intergenerational correlations of 0.520 and 0.517, respectively.
These results indicate quite a bit of variation of intergenerational educational mobility
across Europe.
Looking more closely at the correlations at the country level reveals that the four
Nordic nations are all among those countries with the lowest intergenerational correlations.
Furthermore, the intergenerational correlations in the four Nordic countries are rather
similar, ranging from just 0.406 (Denmark) to 0.454 (Norway). The two Anglo-Saxon
countries (the UK at 0.461 and Ireland at 0.519) show similar (to each other) but distinctly
higher (than the Nordic countries) correlations. The other clusters do not reveal these clear
similarities inside the clusters themselves.
Some countries within the Continental cluster have a similar intergenerational corre-
lation (the range for Austria, France, the Netherlands and Switzerland is between just
0.447 and 0.485), but Belgium shows comparatively high persistence (0.570), and Ger-
many shows remarkably low persistence (0.412). These exceptions may be related to the
particular structure of the educational system and the labor market responses to education
in these two countries. In Germany, vocational training and an emphasis on apprentice-
ships result in less pronounced differences in wage returns to higher education as in other
countries, diminishing benefits to descendants of highly educated parents there (Martins
and Pereira, 2004). In Belgium, on the other hand, larger returns to education result in
8The associations are shown in table A.1 in the appendix. For almost all countries and clusters, the
correlation between parent’s and descendant’s educational attainment is higher than the association. This
result occurs because the standard deviation of the parental educational distribution is generally larger
than in the descendant population (see equation 2 and the relevant descriptive statistics in table 1).
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stronger income benefits of having higher education, making it potentially more difficult for
descendants of less educated parents to progress (OECD, 2008, tables A10.2 and A10.6).
The Southern countries are among the least mobile ones, but with especially high
correlations for Portugal (0.553) and Spain (0.588). However, one nation in this relatively
high-persistence cluster, Greece, places in the group of the most mobile countries in all
of Europe, with an intergenerational correlation of 0.425. It is unclear why persistence in
Greece is so low.
Finally, the countries in the Eastern cluster have the highest correlations, but again
there are two extremes. On the one hand, this generally highly persistent cluster contains
the Czech Republic, which turns out to be the most mobile country in this dataset with
an intergenerational correlation of just 0.400. On the other hand, the cluster also contains
Bulgaria, which is the the least mobile country in the sample with an intergenerational
correlation of 0.620. The Eastern cluster should be interpreted with care because of the
heterogeneous economic and social circumstances of the countries in this cluster. How-
ever, three of our four Eastern European nations rank similarly with respect to the very
high level of intergenerational persistence, and the exception of the Czech Republic may
be related to the fact that the Czech Republic boasts distinctly lower levels of income
inequality and poverty rates than the other three Eastern countries (Eurostat, 2014a;b).
These measures of inequality are often associated with, although not necessarily a cause of,
less intergenerational persistence, as displayed in the “Great Gatsby Curve.” Less economic
inequality may be associated with less intergenerational persistence because more equality
provides children with more equal opportunities, regardless of the family they were born
into.
Overall, we observe quite strong variation in the intergenerational correlations across
country clusters, with results ranging from 0.400 in the Czech Republic and 0.406 in Den-
mark, to 0.588 in Spain and 0.620 in Bulgaria. It is clear that there is educational persis-
tence in all European countries. The cluster-level analysis shows the Nordic cluster is the
least persistent, and the Eastern and Southern clusters are the most.
4.2 Changes in Intergenerational Educational Persistence Over Time
The previous sub-section analyzed intergenerational educational persistence in Europe
for people of working age (25-65). While illuminating, these findings are limited to this age
group. In this section, we broaden our analysis to the population of respondents between
25 and 90 years old, and examine how the intergenerational educational correlation has
developed over time. This analysis studies the correlation between all descendants and
all parents (regardless of gender), where parental education years are taken to be the
average of a descendant’s mother’s and father’s educational attainment. The results must
be interpreted with some care, because sample sizes, especially for the oldest cohorts, are
often small.
Figure 2 shows the average intergenerational correlation per age group (in 1-year co-
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horts; thus all people born in a certain year) in each country cluster, with a fitted line with
slope τ to show the development of the correlation over time.9 The Nordic and Southern
clusters show a clear and statistically significant decline in intergenerational mobility over
time, while there has not been a significant change in the intergenerational educational
correlation for adults between the ages of 25 and 90 in the three other clusters.
— Figure 2 about here —
In the Nordic cluster, there was a clear decline in intergenerational persistence from
about 0.500 for those aged 90 to 0.350 for respondents aged 25. For the Southern countries,
there is also a significant drop in the correlations, starting from the highest point of all
clusters (0.600) and going down to slightly above 0.400 for the 25 year-old descendants.
These results are highly statistically significant. In the Eastern, Continental and Anglo-
Saxon clusters, the level of intergenerational persistence has not changed much over time,
but with a slight downward trend in the Continental and Anglo-Saxon clusters and a
constant trend in the Eastern cluster. Note that there are significant changes over time in
some individual countries within these clusters (see figure A.1), but there is no consistent
pattern for the cluster as a whole.
There is greater variation in the intergenerational correlation over age in some clus-
ters compared to others. The correlations in the Eastern cluster huddle fairly consistently
around 0.500 over time, with more variation for the older groups. The same is true in
the Continental cluster, but at slightly lower correlations. The Anglo-Saxon and Southern
clusters show the greatest variation in correlations over time, especially for older age co-
horts, which could be due to the smaller number of observations of descendants aged 65
and above. The general downward trends in the Continental, Nordic, Anglo-Saxon and
Southern clusters fit the policy profile of those clusters with which the persistence might be
related: over the last ninety years, access to education has expanded. Interestingly, there
is no such similar evidence for the Eastern European countries in our sample, implying
that despite aiming at societal equality via state socialism, educational persistence has
remained steady for almost a century. Yet we note that our sample of Eastern Europe
is restricted to only four countries, which each have unique developments of educational
persistence. However, looking at the trend on the country level (see appendix figure A.1),
one sees that – with the exception of Bulgaria – intergenerational persistence has decreased
over time in all Eastern European countries.
We see significant changes to intergenerational educational persistence over time in the
Nordic and Southern countries, with the youngest cohorts in the Southern cluster now
reaching correlation rates similar to those in other clusters, despite the relatively high
persistence faced by older descendants in that cluster.
9The OLS equation employed to fit the line is γac = α + τ1ageac + εac, where γ are intergenerational
educational correlations, α is a constant term and ε is an error term with the usual properties for every
age group a in each country c. The cluster correlations are taken as the average of the τ coefficients for
the cluster.
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4.3 The Gendered Nature of Intergenerational Educational Persistence
Table 2 presents intergenerational educational correlations by the gender of the parent
and the descendant, in the columns titled father-son, mother-son, father-daughter, and
mother-daughter. These are the estimates for γ1, γ2, γ1 + γ3, and γ2 + γ4 from equation
5, respectively. The last column of the table, titled female, gives the coefficients for the
dummy variable on the gender of the descendant (γ5 in equation 5), showing whether being
female is linked with a higher (positive value) or lower (negative value) education than that
of the male descendants.
The differences in the intergenerational correlations across gender-pairs are rather strik-
ing. Across Europe, fathers are more influential for the education of the sons than mothers
are, in the sense that the persistence of educational outcomes between fathers and sons is
higher than for any other gender pair: the averages across Europe show that the correla-
tion between fathers and sons (0.331) is higher than between mothers and sons (0.185).
Fathers’ educational attainment also appears to be more important for sons than it is for
daughters (across Europe the intergenerational correlation is 0.331 compared to 0.259).
This is not the case in Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Italy, Portugal, and the UK
(confirming the results for the UK in Chevalier et al. (2013a)), although these differences
are quite small, except for in Italy. These overall results support the gender role theory
discussed in section 2, in which descendants learn gender-appropriate skills and compe-
tencies from their parents and are more likely to follow in the educational steps of their
same-gender parent. Here sons are more likely to be like their fathers.
Similarly, the relationship between the educational attainment of mothers and their
daughters is stronger than between mothers and their sons. The average correlation of
educational years between mothers and daughters is 0.290, compared to 0.185 between
mothers and sons. It is rather remarkable that only in Belgium, Finland, and the UK, the
persistence between mothers’ and sons’ educational attainment is stronger than between
mothers and daughters, and in the latter two countries, those differences are very small.
On average, the correlation between fathers’ and daughters’ education (0.259) is weaker
than between mothers and daughters (0.290), and although there is variation on a country
level, this is true for all Eastern and Nordic countries.
The household production model discussed in section 2 predicts that fathers’ increased
educational attainment always has a positive effect on the (genderless) children’s educa-
tional attainment, while an increase in mothers’ educational attainment has an ambiguous
effect. Our results show that the hypothesis is correct, insofar that fathers’ increased ed-
ucational attainment has a positive effect on children’s educational attainment, and this
effect is generally (but not always) stronger than that of mothers’ increased education. The
results further show, though, that there are seemingly systematic differences in the strength
of the intergenerational persistence based on the gender of the parent and descendant in
question. Fathers’ education is more strongly correlated to sons’, while mothers’ education
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is more strongly related to daughters’. In general, though, sons’ education is more strongly
related to their parents’ education than that of daughters. While in many countries it is
the fathers whose educational attainment is strongly correlated to the education levels of
both sons and daughters, in the Nordic and Eastern countries it is mothers’ education that
appears to be more strongly correlated with daughters’ education.
4.4 An Integration of the Results
After having examined differences in intergenerational persistence by country and coun-
try cluster, age, and gender separately in sections 4.1-4.3, we now integrate these three
dimensions of socio-demographic difference into a single analysis. Figure 3 shows the devel-
opment of the average intergenerational correlation for five-year cohorts by country clusters
over time, for men and women separately. These age cohorts are larger (five years instead
of one year) than those used in section 4.2 because the split by gender makes the sample
sizes too small for single year analyses in some years. Thus, to get more representative
results, we use five-year cohorts.10
A line fitting the equation γcg = αcg + Φ ∗ cohortbirthyearscg + εcg for the subsamples
of each country-cluster c and gender g predicts the intergenerational correlation γ by age
cohort.
— Figure 3 about here —
A first result from figure 3 is that intergenerational educational persistence varies greatly
by country cluster, gender, and age, and that its development over time is very different for
these different socio-demographic groups. For all ten groups shown in figure 3, educational
persistence has either stayed the same or sunk over time (negative Φ), but persistence has
not increased. Male descendants in the Eastern cluster are the only exception, showing
a slightly positive Φ (rising persistence over time), though this result is not statistically
significant. In half of the countries, the change in the persistence over time is small and
statistically insignificant, while in the others – such as women in the Southern cluster – the
development is very strongly negative and statistically significant. Thus these three socio-
demographic groups experience the strength of the change in intergenerational educational
persistence over time quite differently.
Further, there are differences in the degree of intergenerational persistence that mem-
bers of these ten groups face at any point in time. For the descendants who were born
between 1980 and 1985, the degree of intergenerational correlation took on a large range of
values across clusters, from about 0.300 for women in the Nordic cluster to about 0.550 for
men in the Eastern cluster. Similarly, when the respondents were born between 1920 and
1930, the persistence also varied tremendously across country cluster: men of that age in
10Since there are some cases in which there are no men or women over born before 1930 in a country or
a cluster, we use an eleven–year cohort (born between 1920-1930) for this group.
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the Nordic cluster faced intergenerational correlations of about 0.425, while women in the
Southern cluster faced much higher persistence, at about 0.650. Even within a cluster, men
and women faced different degrees of intergenerational persistence; only in the Continental
cluster do men and women have similar correlations all along the age distribution.
Finally, figure 3 shows the necessity of including all three of these dimensions of differ-
ence into an analysis of the determinants of intergenerational persistence. In figure 2 and
the accompanying discussion in section 4.2, we saw that there was a statistically significant
drop in intergenerational persistence over time in the Nordic and Southern clusters. When
we look more closely at the gendered nature of these changes using figure 3, though, we
see that it is only female descendants who experienced declining intergenerational persis-
tence over time; the men in these clusters show no significant change in persistence over
time. Thus, while figure 2 provided insight regarding differences in changes over time by
cluster, including the gender analysis in figure 3 provided a more complete account of how
intergenerational persistence changed over time, and for whom. Women “catching up” in
educational attainment have driven much of the improvement of educational mobility in
Europe.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
This analysis of intergenerational educational persistence across Europe has shown that
people’s educational attainment is influenced by that of their parents. Across Europe, an
additional year of education for parents is correlated with an additional half year of edu-
cation for descendants. However, this estimate is the average intergenerational correlation
across Europe; indeed the strength of the relationship between parental and descendant
education differs greatly by country, over time, and by gender.
The analysis by country cluster reveals that there are noticeable differences across clus-
ters. The cluster classification system originally developed by Esping-Andersen (1990) and
discussed in chapter 3.3 is based on welfare state regimes, which appear to be at least
somewhat associated with outcomes in intergenerational educational persistence. A focus
on both education and social insurance policies, as in the Nordic countries, is related to
lower intergenerational persistence. Both the Continental cluster, which focuses more on
social insurance, and the Anglo-Saxon cluster, which makes more initial investments in
education, have higher intergenerational correlations, suggesting that a focus on either
policy alone may not be especially effective in reducing intergenerational persistence. Fi-
nally, the Southern countries, which rely on family structures rather than public policies,
and the Eastern countries, who have less developed welfare systems, have the highest levels
of intergenerational persistence.
Taking the analysis of the clusters several decades back by looking at those born in
1920 and afterwards, we find that intergenerational educational persistence has decreased
in Nordic and Southern countries, while there has been no significant change over time
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in the rest of Europe. However, a more detailed analysis of developments over time by
gender gives a more nuanced story. In the Anglo-Saxon cluster it is only men who show
a significant decrease in their intergenerational educational persistence; in the Continen-
tal cluster both men and women experienced a significant decline in the intergenerational
persistence; and the Eastern European countries, as already mentioned, reveal no signif-
icant change in persistence over time. On the other hand, in the Nordic and Southern
countries the downward trend we observe for the entire cluster is very clearly driven by
decreases in intergenerational persistence for women. Indeed the persistence has not signif-
icantly changed for men in either of these clusters and persistence for men in the Southern
countries remains relatively high.
Across Europe, it is the fathers whose education is the critical determinant of sons’
educational attainment, while mothers’ educational attainment matters most for their
daughters’ education. In most countries, fathers’ education is also more influential for
the educational attainment of the sons than for that of the daughters. Yet daughters are
especially dependent on the education of their mothers in the Nordic and Eastern countries,
as well as in a handful of other countries around Europe. These results show that the gender
of both the parent and the descendant is crucially important in passing on educational
advantages or disadvantages from one generation to the next. The household production
model discussed in section 2 therefore does not adequately predict the relationship between
parental and descendant education. This may be because the model does not reflect the
modern reality of women’s high labor force participation and changing social norms, which
increasingly hold fathers responsible for children’s education as much as mothers. Instead,
the patterns of the strength of the intergenerational correlations by gender suggest that
gender role attitudes and role models within a household are important in determining
people’s educational attainment, as descendants are most likely to follow in their same-
gender parents’ educational footsteps.
These findings can have important implications for policy aimed at reducing and elim-
inating the gender wage gap and gender-based occupational segregation. These gaps are
explained in large part by women’s occupational choice, labor market supply (the number
of hours spent in the labor market), and labor market discrimination. For all these reasons
(which also overlap each other), women’s investment in higher education does not pay off
as much as men’s because more women engage in part-time work or are segregated into
lower-paying industries and occupations. Public policy offering universal and high quality
child care can help bridge the gap between high education and labor market equality for
women. First, child care can be made high-quality, by demanding more highly educated
caregivers, and providing high-paying jobs for highly educated employees – who are, in
that sector, mainly women. Second, it would promote women’s employment in other sec-
tors which demand highly educated workers with flexible schedules by providing care for
their children while they are at work. Thus women’s labor market supply could increase
and women could become more willing to enter traditionally male fields. At the same
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time, the stereotype of women being uncommitted to work would fade as their opportuni-
ties to do more work expand. These changes could reduce discrimination against women,
further enhancing the first two effects. The children of these highly educated mothers –
and especially daughters, following the results in this paper – would benefit by positive
gains to their own education, by having more income in the household, by receiving better
childcare, and by having a positive role model in the household. Thus a virtuous circle of
women’s advancement in the labor market could develop.
Not only the daughters would benefit from these policies. Sons are also often con-
strained by the financial restrictions of their parents, and those benefits would positively
affect them, too. Especially but not exclusively in the case of single mothers, universal
child care can help reduce the risk of child poverty by increasing mothers’ ability to work
and provide sufficient financial resources. The sons and daughters would then benefit and
face more educational opportunities, leading to higher intergenerational mobility. The pos-
itive effect of early education programs on a child’s later outcomes are widely recognized
(Heckman, 2008; Schütz et al., 2008; Cunha and Heckman, 2009; Currie and Almond, 2011;
OECD, 2010). Insufficient supply or a lack of quality of these programs leads to restricted
chances for children to benefit from them, and makes it more difficult for mothers to work
and contribute to household income. Consequently, early childhood programs and their
link with female employment may help explain the lower intergenerational persistence in
the Nordic countries. It is not the education system alone which provides more equal op-
portunities than in other countries, but instead the joint investment in (early childhood)
education and social policies to support families and avoid poverty, especially child poverty
(Esping-Andersen, 2004). Hence, the higher rate of female employment caused by universal
high-quality child care and lower child poverty rates might be an important aspect of the
Nordic countries’ lower intergenerational persistence.
The positive results for the Nordic countries – low persistence, which has become even
lower over time – suggest that other countries looking to reduce their intergenerational
persistence may benefit from considering Nordic social policy. Investing in universal welfare
policies instead of focusing on either educational or social insurance policies alone or relying
largely on family structures, together with a less unequal society, are associated with the
lowest intergenerational mobility.
An important lesson from this paper is that the intergenerational persistence in edu-
cational outcomes is variable and depends on institutional context and historical period.
Thus, it can be changed: movement towards more meritocratic ideals (hence lower inter-
generational persistence) will be a matter of social commitment to these goals; not just
for reasons of fairness but to support and preserve European wealth, prosperity and its
welfare systems it is of utmost importance to realize the full productive potential of each
and every individual – men and women alike.
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Figure 1: Intergenerational Correlations plotted against various policy profile measures
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Table 1: Descriptives Statistics on Educational Attainment, Respondents Aged 25-65
Country Sample Size Average Years Standard Deviation
All Male Descendants 11291 12.71 3.56
Female Descendants 12424 12.66 3.61
Fathers 23715 9.49 4.42
Mothers 23715 8.94*** 4.19
Austria Male Descendants 672 12.32 2.29
Female Descendants 769 12.18 2.39
Fathers 1441 11.08 2.69
Mothers 1441 10.12 2.62
Belgium Male Descendants 472 12.56 3.32
Female Descendants 531 12.82 3.08
Fathers 1003 9.57 4.27
Mothers 1003 8.93*** 4.01
Bulgaria Male Descendants 677 11.96 3.29
Female Descendants 814 12.33* 3.62
Fathers 1491 9.55 3.78
Mothers 1491 9.35*** 3.96
Czech Republic Male Descendants 831 12.87 2.01
Female Descendants 794 13.03 2.03
Fathers 1625 12.21 2.22
Mothers 1625 11.73*** 2.26
Denmark Male Descendants 502 14.24 3.08
Female Descendants 487 14.33 2.92
Fathers 989 10.29 4.11
Mothers 989 10.54** 4.22
Finland Male Descendants 605 12.76 4.11
Female Descendants 569 13.45*** 3.48
Fathers 1174 8.25 5.36
Mothers 1174 8.15 4.91
France Male Descendants 476 11.89 3.43
Female Descendants 543 12.28* 3.30
Fathers 1019 8.15 4.11
Mothers 1019 7.27*** 3.69
Germany Male Descendants 885 14.24 2.45
Female Descendants 884 13.77*** 2.59
Fathers 1769 12.85 2.82
Mothers 1769 11.55*** 2.69
Greece Male Descendants 574 12.19 3.53
Female Descendants 789 11.97 3.37
Fathers 1363 5.81 3.97
Mothers 1363 5.06*** 3.45
Hungary Male Descendants 477 11.75 2.85
Female Descendants 538 12.13** 3.02
Fathers 1015 9.60 3.57
Mothers 1015 9.04*** 3.46
Continued on next page...
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Table 1: continued
Country Sample Size Average Years Standard Deviation
Ireland Male Descendants 691 13.84 3.33
Female Descendants 854 13.95 3.21
Fathers 1545 9.86 3.92
Mothers 1545 10.19*** 3.73
Italy Male Descendants 496 11.31 4.12
Female Descendants 521 10.94 4.26
Fathers 1017 7.41 3.68
Mothers 1017 6.69*** 3.00
Netherlands Male Descendants 503 14.71 3.94
Female Descendants 635 13.89*** 3.70
Fathers 1138 11.35 4.12
Mothers 1138 9.99*** 3.18
Norway Male Descendants 540 15.05 2.60
Female Descendants 466 15.08 2.70
Fathers 1006 12.72 3.64
Mothers 1006 11.89*** 3.39
Poland Male Descendants 534 12.77 2.59
Female Descendants 548 13.47*** 2.67
Fathers 1082 10.34 3.23
Mothers 1082 10.28 3.24
Portugal Male Descendants 458 8.35 4.40
Female Descendants 653 7.92 4.41
Fathers 1111 3.91 3.25
Mothers 1111 3.45*** 3.26
Spain Male Descendants 620 11.62 4.45
Female Descendants 614 11.74 4.58
Fathers 1234 6.79 4.99
Mothers 1234 5.94*** 4.37
Sweden Male Descendants 388 12.75 2.55
Female Descendants 416 13.18** 2.74
Fathers 804 9.39 4.14
Mothers 804 9.46 3.90
Switzerland Male Descendants 477 13.40 2.88
Female Descendants 451 13.10 3.15
Fathers 928 11.43 3.70
Mothers 928 10.05*** 3.29
United Kingdom Male Descendants 413 12.38 3.81
Female Descendants 548 12.46 3.60
Fathers 961 9.52 4.03
Mothers 961 9.03*** 3.53
Notes: Authors’ calculations on weighted ESS data. Statistically significant differences in
means for men versus women and mothers versus fathers are indicated with ***(p<.01),
**(p<.05), or *(p<.10).
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Table 2: Intergenerational Educational Correlations - Respondents aged 25-65
Country Nmen
N
women
All parents -
All
descendants
Father-Son Father-Daughter Mother-Son
Mother-
Daughter Female
Continental 3485 3813 0.478 0.323 0.292 0.178 0.269 -0.30
Austria 672 769 0.485 0.321 0.277 0.160 0.324 -0.51
(0.029) (0.049) (0.048) (0.041) (0.048) (0.262)
Belgium 472 531 0.570 0.343 0.360 0.314 0.227 0.22
(0.027) (0.054) (0.042) (0.051) (0.042) (0.223)
France 476 543 0.485 0.307 0.238 0.247 0.276 0.17
(0.028) (0.064) (0.052) (0.064) (0.047) (0.150)
Germany 885 884 0.412 0.388 0.277 0.017 0.239 -0.60
(0.038) (0.050) (0.053) (0.048) (0.050) (0.389)
Netherlands 503 635 0.468 0.328 0.334 0.150 0.222 -0.44
(0.027) (0.051) (0.039) (0.052) (0.042) (0.201)
Switzerland 477 451 0.447 0.252 0.267 0.181 0.326 -0.65
(0.034) (0.056) (0.061) (0.050) (0.061) (0.242)
Nordic 2035 1938 0.433 0.308 0.196 0.185 0.268 0.17
Denmark 502 487 0.406 0.275 0.195 0.185 0.267 0.05
(0.032) (0.059) (0.048) (0.054) (0.045) (0.198)
Finland 605 569 0.422 0.265 0.186 0.240 0.232 0.32
(0.026) (0.048) (0.044) (0.049) (0.043) (0.123)
Norway 540 466 0.454 0.419 0.174 0.107 0.313 0.16
(0.028) (0.043) (0.058) (0.043) (0.055) (0.239)
Sweden 388 416 0.449 0.275 0.229 0.209 0.262 0.15
(0.035) (0.070) (0.063) (0.066) (0.066) (0.199)
Continued on next page...
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Table 2: continued
Country Nmen
N
women
All parents -
All
descendants
Father-Son Father-Daughter Mother-Son
Mother-
Daughter Female
Anglo-Saxon 1104 1402 0.490 0.285 0.231 0.225 0.326 -0.11
Ireland 691 854 0.519 0.313 0.176 0.208 0.417 -0.15
(0.025) (0.057) (0.035) (0.059) (0.038) (0.171)
UK 413 548 0.461 0.257 0.286 0.241 0.236 -0.07
(0.027) (0.063) (0.041) (0.062) (0.043) (0.186)
Southern 2148 2577 0.517 0.361 0.301 0.175 0.282 -0.13
Greece 574 789 0.425 0.405 0.220 0.075 0.230 -0.04
(0.024) (0.060) (0.044) (0.060) (0.44) (0.104)
Italy 496 521 0.503 0.329 0.399 0.153 0.212 -0.33
(0.027) (0.063) (0.051) (0.064) (0.054) (0.143)
Portugal 458 653 0.553 0.244 0.257 0.314 0.383 -0.14
(0.027) (0.073) (0.049) (0.063) (0.052) (0.083)
Spain 620 614 0.588 0.469 0.326 0.157 0.301 0.01
(0.022) (0.047) (0.045) (0.050) (0.046) (0.086)
Eastern 2519 2694 0.520 0.357 0.245 0.185 0.335 0.08
Bulgaria 677 814 0.620 0.417 0.266 0.207 0.404 -0.01
(0.022) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.053) (0.128)
Czech Rep. 831 794 0.400 0.335 0.201 0.120 0.245 0.16
(0.031) (0.051) (0.046) (0.046) (0.050) (0.371)
Hungary 477 538 0.532 0.353 0.302 0.192 0.305 0.01
(0.028) (0.062) (0.054) (0.063) (0.053) (0.169)
Poland 534 548 0.527 0.325 0.210 0.222 0.386 0.18
(0.025) (0.074) (0.050) (0.067) (0.050) (0.177)
Total 11291 12424 0.486 0.331 0.259 0.185 0.290 -0.08
Notes: Authors’ calculations on survey weighted 2010 European Social Survey data. All estimates, except for those on
the female dummy variable, are statistically significant at the p<.01 level.
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Figure 2: Educational correlations over age of descendants (25-90 years) by country clus-
tersa
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aFour outliers (with negative correlations) in the dataset were left out of this analysis. There are people
born 1920 in the Continental cluster (γ=-0.346); born 1921 in the Eastern cluster (γ=-0.500); born 1925
in the Anglo-Saxon cluster (γ=-0.247); and born 1983 in the Nordic cluster (γ=-0.032).
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Figure 3: Educational correlations by country clusters, 5-year age cohorts, and gendera
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Table A.1: Intergenerational Educational Associations - Respondents aged 25-65
Country Nmen
N
women
All parents -
All
descendants
Father-Son Father-Daughter Mother-Son
Mother-
Daughter Female
Continental 3485 3813 0.471 0.275 0.247 0.163 0.252 -0.85
Austria 672 769 0.475 0.281 0.242 0.143 0.290 -1.19
(0.028) (0.043) (0.042) (0.036) (0.043) (0.614)
Belgium 472 531 0.481 0.257 0.269 0.250 0.181 0.71
(0.023) (0.040) (0.032) (0.041) (0.034) (0.502)
France 476 543 0.460 0.251 0.195 0.225 0.251 0.59
(0.026) (0.053) (0.042) (0.059) (0.043) (0.504)
Germany 885 884 0.428 0.348 0.248 0.016 0.224 -1.53
(0.039) (0.045) (0.047) (0.045) (0.047) (0.985)
Netherlands 503 635 0.550 0.306 0.310 0.180 0.266 -1.69
(0.032) (0.048) (0.036) (0.062) (0.050) (0.770)
Switzerland 477 451 0.433 0.206 0.218 0.166 0.300 -1.96
(0.033) (0.045) (0.050) (0.046) (0.056) (0.732)
Nordic 2035 1938 0.345 0.218 0.137 0.136 0.198 0.55
Denmark 502 487 0.332 0.200 0.142 0.131 0.190 0.15
(0.026) (0.043) (0.035) (0.038) (0.032) (0.593)
Finland 605 569 0.345 0.190 0.133 0.187 0.181 1.22
(0.022) (0.034) (0.044) (0.038) (0.043) (0.473)
Norway 540 466 0.380 0.304 0.126 0.083 0.244 0.43
(0.024) (0.031) (0.042) (0.037) (0.043) (0.631)
Sweden 388 416 0.321 0.176 0.147 0.143 0.178 0.39
(0.025) (0.045) (0.041) (0.045) (0.045) (0.530)
Continued on next page...
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Table A.1: continued
Country Nmen
N
women
All parents -
All
descendants
Father-Son Father-Daughter Mother-Son
Mother-
Daughter Female
Anglo-Saxon 1104 1402 0.488 0.248 0.204 0.217 0.306 -0.38
Ireland 691 854 0.478 0.260 0.146 0.182 0.365 -0.50
(0.023) (0.047) (0.029) (0.051) (0.034) (0.558)
UK 413 548 0.499 0.235 0.262 0.252 0.247 -0.26
(0.029) (0.058) (0.038) (0.065) (0.045) (0.685)
Southern 2148 2577 0.636 0.370 0.322 0.218 0.338 -0.52
Greece 574 789 0.431 0.350 0.190 0.074 0.229 -0.15
(0.024) (0.052) (0.038) (0.059) (0.43) (0.356)
Italy 496 521 0.684 0.374 0.455 0.214 0.296 -1.38
(0.037) (0.072) (0.058) (0.089) (0.076) (0.601)
Portugal 458 653 0.820 0.331 0.349 0.423 0.517 -0.60
(0.040) (0.099) (0.049) (0.084) (0.052) (0.366)
Spain 620 614 0.608 0.424 0.295 0.162 0.311 0.03
(0.023) (0.042) (0.041) (0.051) (0.047) (0.389)
Eastern 2519 2694 0.484 0.312 0.212 0.159 0.287 0.20
Bulgaria 677 814 0.586 0.383 0.244 0.182 0.354 -0.04
(0.021) (0.049) (0.049) (0.048) (0.047) (0.443)
Czech Rep. 831 794 0.408 0.305 0.183 0.108 0.219 0.33
(0.031) (0.046) (0.042) (0.041) (0.045) (0.750)
Hungary 477 538 0.484 0.292 0.250 0.164 0.260 0.03
(0.025) (0.052) (0.047) (0.054) (0.045) (0.498)
Poland 534 548 0.459 0.267 0.173 0.182 0.316 0.47
(0.022) (0.061) (0.041) (0.055) (0.040) (0.469)
Total 11291 12424 0.483 0.287 0.229 0.173 0.271 -0.25
Notes: Authors’ calculations on survey weighted 2010 European Social Survey data.
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